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Comments
Medicaid's Unhealthy Side Effect: The
Financial Burdens On At-Home Spouses Of
Institutionalized Recipients
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States is an aging nation. Presently, over eleven percent of this country's population is elderly.' This percentage is expected to double by the year 2030 as the "baby-boomers," people
born between 1946 and 1964, grow older. 2 Accompanying the aging of the population is an increased demand for long-term nursing
home care for the elderly.3 The cost of nursing home care, however, is continually increasing4 and many elderly patients are unable to pay for needed care. Consequently, those people have
entered the Medicaid system.
Medicaid, a health plan for the poor, is jointly provided by the
federal and state governments.5 Because it is a program for the
needy, individuals qualify for Medicaid benefits only if they live
substantially below the poverty level or reduce their assets below a
certain amount. 6 Essentially, individuals are forced to become destitute before they are eligible for Medicaid. 7
Spouses of institutionalized Medicaid recipients face incredible
financial hardship as a result of the Medicaid program. Although
Medicaid takes care of the recipient spouse, it may not help the
1. Rovner, Long-Term Care: The True "Catastrophe?",44 CONG. Q. 1227, 1228
(1986). "Elderly" refers to individuals who are older than 65 years of age. Id.
2. Id. The number of people over the age of 85 is expected to increase fivefold by the
year 2040. Id.
3. Id. at 1229. In 1984, there were 1.2 million elderly nursing home residents. It is
expected that this number will increase 58% by the year 2003. Id.
4. Id. In 1984, the total nursing home cost for the nation was $32 billion, an increase
from $4.7 billion in 1970. Id.
5. Herweg v. Ray, 619 F.2d 1265, 1277 (8th Cir. 1980) (McMillian, J., dissenting).
In 1984, Medicaid paid $13.9 billion, or 43.4% of the nation's total nursing home costs of
$32 billion. Rovner, supra note 1, at 1229.
6. Rovner, supra note 1, at 1228.
7. Id. The amount of Medicaid assistance that will be contributed depends upon the
applicant's state of residence and the type of care he needs. There is some discrepancy
between states in the amount paid and the treatment covered.

1031

1032

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 18

non-institutionalized spouse who also had to become poor for her 8
spouse to qualify for Medicaid. 9 After this, the non-institutionalized, or "at-home," spouse is forced to live at or below the poverty
level.1° To avoid this burden, some at-home spouses have sued
their institutionalized spouse for support," while others have re2
sorted to divorce.'
This comment will trace the development of the eligibility rules
in the Medicaid statute. Next, it will describe the practices of the
agencies that administer the Medicaid program and illustrate how
these practices have resulted in severe financial burdens on athome spouses. The comment then will analyze the cases that have
challenged those practices and evaluate the legislation designed to
alleviate the burdens. The comment concludes by recommending
changes that will reduce the identified problems.
II. BACKGROUND

A.

The FederalMedicaid Statute

In 1965, Congress established the Medicaid 3 program to provide the needy with greater access to medical services.' 4 Under the
Medicaid program, the federal government provides financial
assistance to those states that reimburse health care providers for
the cost of certain medical treatment supplied to the needy.'"
Under the original plan, two classes of people received Medicaid
assistance. The first class was known as the "categorically
needy". 16 Congress determined that the categorically needy de8. The use of the word "her" does not imply that the wife is always the at-home
spouse. It is just as likely that the husband is the non-institutionalized spouse. The use of
the words "his," "her," "he," or "she" do not signify gender but instead serve as generic
pronouns.
9. Whether Medicaid helps the at-home spouse varies from state to state. In some
states, the spouse herself may qualify for Medicaid or other assistance.
10. Gray Panthers v. Administrator, Health Care Financing Admin., 629 F.2d 180,
186 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Manfredi v. Maher, 435 F. Supp. 1106, 1110 n.8 (D. Conn. 1977).
11. Sullivan, Nursing Costs Force Elderly to Sue Spouses, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1986.
at A1.
12. Id. See Gray Panthers,629 F.2d at 186 n. 14; Burns v. Vowell, 424 F. Supp. 1135,
1138 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
13. Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396p (1982 & Supp. III
1985).
14. Norman v. St. Clair, 610 F.2d 1228, 1230 (5th Cir. 1980).
15. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). The type of treatment that Medicaid
covers varies from state to state.
16. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Servs. v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34,
37 (1981). The categorically needy included individuals covered by the following programs: Old Age Assistance, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-306 (1970); Aid to Families with Depen-
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served public assistance because of family circumstances, age, or
in Medicaid were required to
disability.' 7 All states participating
18
provide assistance to this group.
The second group of recipients under the plan were known as
"medically needy." The medically needy included individuals who
did not qualify for categorical assistance, but nevertheless lacked
sufficient funds to meet their medical expenses. 9 States had the
option of providing funds to the medically needy.2 0 A state electing to supply benefits to both groups, however, was required to use
the same eligibility standards for both.2
States presently participating in the Medicaid program must
submit a plan for medical assistance to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services for approval.22 The state's plan must meet certain
federal guidelines;2 3 describe the nature and scope of the state program, including eligibility requirements; and provide assurances
that the state will continue to conform with the federal guidelines. 24 State participation in the Medicaid program is, for the
most part, optional. 25 Once the choice to participate is made, however, the state must follow the federal regulations.2 6 Under the
program, a state whose plan is approved becomes entitled to federal reimbursment for a percentage of the payments made by the
state for medical assistance to eligible individuals.2 7
B.

The State Options

Presently, states participate in the Medicaid progam under one
of two categories: the Supplemental Security Income for the Aged,
Blind and Disabled program ("1SSI"1)2S or Section 209(b) of the
dent Children, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1970); Aid to the Blind, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1206
(1970); Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1355 (1970).
17. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
18. Schweiker, 453 U.S. at 37 (1981).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Winter v. Miller, 676 F.2d 276, 277 (7th Cir. 1982).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (1982).
25. Norman, 610 F.2d at 1231.

26. Id. Although the state must conform to federal guidelines, those guidelines allow
the state substantial autonomy in the administration of its plan. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1396a(a)(4)(A), 1396a(a)(5), 1396a(a)(9)(B) (1982).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(2) (1982).
28.

Id. at §§ 1381-1385.
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1972 amendments to the Medicaid Act ("Section 209(b)"). 29 Each
state chooses the category best suited for the particular needs of
that state.
1. Supplemental Security Income Program
In 1972, Congress, concerned with national uniformity, created
the SSI program. 30 The SSI program federalized the state-administered programs for the aged,3 blind,32 and disabled33 under which
the "categorically needy" previously received assistance.34 Under
SSI, the federal government assumed sole responsibility for the
program funding and eligibility.35
Because the standards promulgated by SSI were less restrictive
than many of the previous state-run categorical needs programs,
more individuals within those states became eligible for assistance. 36 The increased number of eligible individuals under SSI's
less restrictive standards, in turn, threatened to increase those
states' Medicaid obligations.37 Congress feared, however, that
rather than expand their Medicaid coverage, some states might decide to withdraw from the cooperative Medicaid program.38
2.

Section 209(b) Option

In an effort to encourage continued participation of states whose
previous standards were more stringent than the new SSI standards,3 9 Congress enacted the "Section 209(b) option."'4 States
29. Section 209(b) of the 1972 amendments, as amended, is set forth in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(f) (1982). See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (1972) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (1982
& Supp. III 1985)). The legislative history suggests that one of the main purposes of the
SSI program was to improve the effectiveness of adult assistance through the use of nationally uniform eligibility requirements. Case of Hamner, 427 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (La.
1983) (quoting H. R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4,reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4989, 4992).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-306 (1970).
32. Id. at §§ 1201-1206.
33. Id. at §§ 1351-1355.
34. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. The fourth program under which the
categorically needy previously received assistance, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1970), is not covered by SSI and continues to be state-administered. Schweiker, 453 U.S. at 38 n.3.
35. Id. at 38.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 553, 93d Cong. (1973)).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(f) (1982). The section provides that:
[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter ... no State not eligi-
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choosing the Section 209(b) option4 are allowed to retain their
standards of eligibility for assistance used on January 1, 1972, but
are prohibited from imposing any eligibility limits below those in
force on that date.42 Section 209(b) states may set income limits
higher than those used on January 1, 1972, but may not set them
higher than the federal limit under SSI. States opting for the Section 209(b) program must assist both the categorically needy and
the medically needy.43 In addition, Section 209(b) option states are
required to adopt a "spend-down" provision." This provision ensures that an individual who is otherwise eligible for SSI, but
whose income exceeds the state standard, becomes eligible for
Medicaid when the amount of income in excess of the state stan45
dard is spent on expenses for medical care.
III.

THE BURDENS

The Congressional enactment of the Section 209(b) option
caused a special problem for non-institutionalized spouses of institutionalized Medicaid recipients. This problem, known as "deeming," is inherent in the Section 209(b) program.4 6 "Reverse
ble to participate in the State plan program subchapter XVI of this chapter shall
be required to provide medical assistance to any aged, blind or disabled individual .. .for any month unless such State would be (or would have been) required
to provide medical assistance to such individual for such month had its plan for
medical assistance approved under this subchapter and in effect January 1,
1972, been in effect in such month, except that for this purpose any such individual shall be deemed eligible for medical assistance under such State plan if
... the income of any such individual as determined in accordance with section
1396b(f) of this title (after deducting any supplemental security income payment and State supplemental payment made with respect to such individual,
and incurred expenses for medical care as recognized under State law) is not in
excess of the standard for medical assistance established under the State plan as
in effect on January 1, 1972.
Id.
41. Fourteen states are presently Section 209(b) option states: Connecticut, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah and Virginia. See MEDICARE & MEDICAID
GUIDE (CCH)
15,550-660 (1985-86). Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands are
also covered by the section 209(b) option because the SSI program never took effect there.
Schweiker, 453 U.S. at 39 n.6.
42. Gray Panthers v. Secretary, Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 461 F. Supp.
319, 321 (D.D.C. 1978).
43. Winter v. Miller, 676 F.2d 276, 278 (7th Cir. 1982).
44. Schweiker, 453 U.S. at 39 n.5.
45. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(f) (1982) which provides that "an individual who
is eligible for medical assistance by reason of the requirements of this section concerning
the deduction of incurred medical expenses from income shall be considered an individual eligible for medical assistance."
46. See infra notes 49-81 and accompanying text.
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deeming," 47 and questions regarding ownership of assets4 8 are two
other burdens that face at-home spouses. While deeming basically
poses a problem only in Section 209(b) states, the two other
problems can occur in any state.
A.

Deeming

1. Statutory Provision
Section 1396(a)(17) of the Social Security Act provides for
deeming.49 Under this section, a state medical assistance plan can
consider a non-institutionalized spouse's resources as being available for paying the medical expenses of an institutionalized
spouse. ° Thus, the funds of the at-home spouse are "deemed"
available for the Medicaid recipient spouse regardless of whether
the funds are actually contributed. 1
State medical assistance plans must include reasonable eligibility
standards that consider only income and resources determined by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to be available to the
applicant. 2 The plan must not take into account any individual's
financial responsibility for the applicant, unless that individual is
the applicant's spouse.5 3

In deeming, the state calculates an amount that will cover the
basic living expenses of the at-home spouse. 54 Because the spouse's
remaining income is "deemed" available to the Medicaid applicant,55 Medicaid will pay only the amount in excess of what the
spouse is deemed able to contribute.
47.

See infra notes 82-114 and accompanying text.

48.

See infra notes 115-50 and accompanying text.

49. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(1982) provides that:
(a) A State plan for medical assistance must - (17) include reasonable standards
...for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the
plan which (A) are consistent with the objectives of this subchapter, (B) provide
for taking into account only such income and resources as are, as determined in
accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the applicant or recipient . . . in determining his eligibility for such aid, assistance, or
benefits, (C) provide for reasonable evaluation of any such income or resources,
and (D) do not take into account the financial responsibility of any individual
for any applicant or recipient of assistance under the plan unless such applicant
or recipient is such individual's spouse ....
Id.
50.

Schweiker, 453 U.S. at 37-38.

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 48.
Id. at § 1396a(a)(17)(B).
Id. at § 1396a(a)(17)(C)-(D).
Schweiker, 453 U.S. at 38.

55.

Id.
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While deeming reduces the state's costs relating to medical care
for a needy individual, the practice often forces the at-home spouse
to subsist at or below the poverty level. 6 The non-institutionalized
spouse thus faces a dilemma. He can pay that portion of his income the state determines he should contribute to the recipient,
and live on a severely fixed income,5 7 or he can refuse to contribute
the money and possibly deny his spouse necessary medical care.58
Presently, under the deeming regulations for SSI states, when
married couples live in the same household, the state must consider
the income and resources of each spouse available to the other,
regardless of whether the income or resources actually are contributed. 9 Certain time limits, however, are placed on this consideration when one of the spouses is institutionalized. In those
instances, the state must consider each spouse's income as available
to the other through the month in which they separate.6" Additionally, their resources are considered available to each other during the month in which they part and for the following six
months. 6'

After the respective time periods have run, the state

cannot consider any of the at-home spouse's income or resources
"available" unless they are actually contributed to the recipient.62
The standards for Section 209(b) option states are substantially
different. Section 209(b) states may either consider income and resources of spouses as available to each other in accordance with the
56. See Herwig v. Ray, 619 F.2d 1265, 1289 (8th Cir. 1980) (McMillian, J., dissenting). ("The maintenance allowances [left for the non-institutionalized spouse to live on]
are generally based on the income standards used to determine Medicaid eligibility and
correspond to welfare subsistence levels.").
The amount left to meet the basic living expenses of the non-institutionalized spouse is
not always adequate. See Burns v. Vowell, 424 F. Supp. 1135, 1138 (S.D.Tex. 1976). In
that case, the at-home spouse had a monthly income of $561.80 and under Texas law, he
was required to pay all but $167.80 to the nursing home where his wife was a resident.
However, the husband testified that this was inadequate to meet his living expenses of
$409.80 per month. Id. See also Schweiker, 453 U.S. at 54-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating that the amount of income not deemed, and therefore protected for the noninstitutionalized spouse's maintenance, may be set at 1972 levels and, therefore, may be
inadequate).
57. Many expenses incurred by both spouses residing at home are not reduced by the
absence of one spouse from the home. Examples of such expenses include mortgage or
rent payments, property taxes and homeowners' insurance.
58. See Franssen v. Juras, 406 F. Supp. 1375, 1377 (D. Or. 1975) ("[The husband]
must choose between the certainty that he cannot provide himself with the necessities of
life and the probability that his wife will be evicted from the nursing home because her
bills are not being paid").
59. 42 C.F.R. § 435.723(b) (1985).
60. Id. at § 435.723(c)(1)(i).
61. Id. at § 435.723(c)(1)(ii).
62. Id. at § 435.723(c).
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SSI standards63 or may impose more restrictive standards upon the
spouses." 4 Thus, Section 209(b) states may consider separated

spouses as a single economic unit for an indefinite time period.
The practical effect of this regulation is to give Section 209(b)
states unlimited power to deem. Since they are basically allowed to
formulate their own standards, Section 209(b) states potentially
can deem income for the entire time the recipient is
institutionalized.
2.

The Validity of the Deeming Statute

In Schweiker v. Gray Panthers,6" the United States Supreme
Court overturned decisions of the trial and appellate courts and
declared deeming valid. 66 The Gray Panthers, an organization representing the nation's elderly, brought an action challenging the
practice of deeming.67 They based their argument on Section
1396a(a)(17) of the Social Security Act 68 and the apparent problem
that statute presents. 69 Though one portion reads that only such
income and resources that are "available" to the applicant can be
taken into account in deeming, 70 another portion can be interpreted to mean that a spouse's income and resources always may
be considered. 7' The Gray Panthers contended that Section 209(b)
states' deeming practices were invalid because they were inconsistent with the Social Security Act, which required the Secretary to
make a reasonable evaluation72 of which resources and income are
"available" to the applicant.
63. Id. at § 435.723.
64. Id. at § 435.734(a). The state may not use standards that are more restrictive
than the standards in effect in the state on January 1, 1972. Id.
65. 453 U.S. 34 (1981).
66. Id. at 49.
67. Gray Panthers v. Secretary, Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 461 F. Supp.
319, 320 (D. D.C. 1978).
68. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
69. Schweiker, 453 U.S. at 40-41.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(B) (1976).
71. Id. at § 1396a(a)(17)(D). See also supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
72. Schweiker, 461 F. Supp. at 320. The plaintiffs' main contention related to 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1976). See supra note 49 and accompanying text. The court,
holding for the plaintiffs, indicated that although the phrase "as determined in accordance with the standards prescribed by the Secretary" in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(B)
(1976) allows the Secretary to decide what is "available," it does not allow him to decide
availability in an arbitrary manner. Schweiker, 461 F. Supp. at 322. The appellate court
affirmed on other grounds. Gray Panthers v. Administrator, Health Care Fin. Admin.,
629 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1980). First, the court determined that the Secretary failed to
consider that separated spouses should no longer be treated as a single economic unit. Id.
at 185. Second, the court reasoned that there is a great potential for needless disruption
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The Supreme Court rejected the Gray Panthers' contention and
ruled that the Secretary's regulations were consistent with the statute.7 3 The Court noted that the Secretary was given an "explicit
delegation of substantive authority" to define the term "available"
and his definition was entitled to the same deference as Congressional legislation. 74 The Court thus concluded that the Secretary
did not exceed his authority when deeming income between
spouses in accordance with Title 42, Section 1396a(a)(17)(D) of the
United States Code, because the statute allows the Secretary to
consider the financial responsibility of the applicant's spouse.
The Court reasoned that if deeming was impermissible, subsection
(D) would be superfluous because under subsection (D), a contribution by the applicant's spouse actually received by the applicant
is automatically taken into account. 7 6 The Court determined that
the word "available" refers not only to those resources that are
actually contributed, but also refers to those resources left to a
couple after the at-home spouse deducts the amount the state determines necessary to pay his or her basic living expenses.77
The Gray Panthers stressed that subsection (D) prohibits deeming and simply permits states to enforce their "relative responsibility laws" 78 when an individual does not contribute to the support
of his or her institutionalized spouse. 79 The Schweiker Court, howof the spouse's lives caused by the requirement that support to the applicant be provided
by the applicant's spouse. Id. at 186.
Though the Gray Panthers case arguably is the most prominent case to hold deeming
invalid, it is neither the first, nor the last to do so. See Brown v. Stanton, 617 F.2d 1224
(7th Cir. 1980); Hanke v. Nyhus, 420 F. Supp. 742 (D. Minn. 1979); Burns v. Vowell, 424
F. Supp. 1135 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Franssen v. Juras, 406 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Or. 1975).
73. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Servs. v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34,
49 (1981).
74. Id. at 44.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 48.
78. Relative responsibility laws require spouses to provide support for each other.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 270a (West 1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 10-2
(1983); MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3174 (West 1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 209
§ 32 (Law Co-op. 1986); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 412 (McKinney 1986); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 31-3103.03 (Baldwin 1985).
79. Schweiker, 453 U.S. at 46. This was not the first time the issue of whether 42
U.S.C. § 1396(a)(17)(D) does nothing more than permit states to enforce their relative
responsibility laws when an at-home spouse fails to contribute to the support of the institutionalized spouse had been raised. The court in Brown v. Stanton, 617 F.2d 1224 (7th
Cir. 1980), holding that deeming was impermissible, affirmatively answered this issue.
The court recognized that to hold otherwise would be unfair to the applicant since
whether he received assistance would depend upon the action of his spouse. Id. at 1231.
The court held that the state welfare agency was required to increase the benefits paid to
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ever, concluded that the Gray Panthers' interpretation of subsection (D) would allow the spouse to exercise discretion in making
the excess payment and thus provide no incentive for voluntary
payment. 80 The Court also reasoned that the Gray Panthers' interpretation of the statute would force the state to engage in a multiplicity of individual lawsuits to enforce the spousal support laws
and recover state money previously paid out.8
B.

Reverse Deeming

"Reverse deeming" occurs when the institutionalized spouse is
the person receiving the income8" that must be used to support the
at-home spouse. Cases addressing reverse deeming usually have
focused on the issue of whether the amount "deemed" from the
institutionalized spouse to the at-home spouse was adequate to
meet the at-home spouse's expenses. The amount deemed is referred to as the maintenance needs allowance ("MNA").
In Mattingly v. Heckler,8 3 a husband and wife challenged Indiana's reverse deeming process.8 4 The husband was an institutionalized Medicaid recipient.8 5 At the time he was receiving Medicaid,
he and his wife had a joint monthly income of $743.97.86 During
this time, his wife was allowed to retain an MNA of $238.00 and
an institutionalized recipient to cover the amount left unpaid by an unwilling spouse, and
then proceed under the spousal support statute to recover from the unwilling spouse. Id.
80. Schweiker, 453 U.S. at 46.
81. Id. The dissent concluded that the District of Columbia Circuit Court was correct in holding that, while deeming was sometimes permissible, virtually unlimited deeming was not. Id. at 52 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens reasoned that the statute
imposed significant restraints on the amount of income that may be deemed. Id. He
pointed out that the legislative history indicates that an assumption that spouses pool
income and resources together to support each other is not valid when one spouse is
institutionalized. Id. at 52-53. Because this basic assumption is invalid, the income of the
spouse is not "actually available" for payment of medical expenses. Id. at 52 n.4. Justice
Stevens likened the situation in Schweiker to the example of income assumed available in
the legislative history. There it was stated that states cannot assume the availability of
income that in fact, may not be available. Examples of this, according to the legislature,
are support orders from absent fathers which have not been paid and contributions from
relatives not actually received. Id. Justice Stevens also agreed with the appellate court
that the Secretary must consider the changes imposed by institutionalization to what was
once, but no longer, a single economic unit and the disruption of the family that deeming
causes. Id. at 53. He concluded that deeming should be limited in both duration and
amount. Id. at 56.
82. Examples of common types of income that an institutionalized recipient earns are
pension benefits, interest income and stock dividends.
83. 784 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1986).
84. Id at 260.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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she was required to pay the remainder to the nursing home. 7 She
contended that she was unable to meet her living expenses on the
amount allotted to her.88
The Mattinglys argued that the Health and Human Services'
("HHS") regulation that limits the amount of the MNA s9 and the
Indiana regulation limiting that state's MNA 90 violated Title 42,
Section 1396a(a)(17) of the United States Code. 9' That section requires a reasonable evaluation of the "availability" of resources to
the applicant. 9 2 The plaintiffs contended that Indiana's use of a
predetermined, fixed MNA was "unreasonable" and in violation of
Section 1396a(a)(17).93 They further argued that the spouse receiving the allowance was forced to live at or below the poverty
level. Finally, they argued, it was "unreasonable" for an at-home
spouse to retain only $238.00 from her institutionalized spouse's
income as an MNA, while an at-home spouse earning the income
retains $577.0091 and is given an opportunity to demonstrate that
the $577.00 is insufficient to meet her needs.9 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend to subsidize non-Medicaid recipients at a higher level than Medicaid beneficiaries. 96 The court
noted that because Indiana's allowance complied with federal regu87. Id. Indiana provides for the needs of non-institutionalized spouses of institutionalized Medicaid recipients with a flat maintenance allowance. Id.
88. A Mr. and Mrs. Jones, almost identically situated to the Mattinglys, joined in the
suit. Id. at 261.
89. 42 C.F.R. § 435.733 (c) (1985). This regulation provides in relevant part:
(c) The agency must deduct ... from the [Medicaid recipient's] total income...
(2) . . . an additional amount for the maintenance needs of the spouse. This
amount must be based on a reasonable assessment of need but must not exceed
the higher of - (i) the more restrictive income standard established under
§ 435.121; or (ii) the medically needy standard for an individual.
Id.
90. IND. CODE § 12-1-7-18.6 (1985). The amount of the allowance when the original
suit was filed in 1981 was $238.00. When the case went to court in 1985, the amount had
increased to $325.00. Mattingly, 784 F.2d at 260 n.1.
91. Mattingly, 784 F.2d at 260.
92. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
93. Mattingly, 784 F.2d at 263. The regulation provides in pertinent part: "A State
plan for medical assistance must -

include reasonable standards . . . for determining

eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(17).
94. Mattingly, 784 F.2d at 263. The amount that an income earning, at-home spouse
may retain when the original suit was filed in 1981 was $577.00. By the time the case
went to court in 1985, the amount had increased to $623.12. Id.
95.

IND. CODE § 12-1-7-18.6 (1985). See Mattingly, 784 F.2d at 263 n.6.

96.

Mattingly, 784 F.2d at 266.
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lations97 and did not exceed the SSI eligibility level, 98 providing a
higher allowance, in essence, would result in more money to a nonMedicaid recipient than to a recipient. 99 Additionally, the court
stated that increasing the maintenance allowance would decrease
°°
Medicaid funds available for the medical care of the needy.'
The court also addressed the disparity between allowances
granted at-home spouses earning income and allowances granted
non-income earning at-home spouses.' 0 ' The court reasoned that
this inequality was justified because a Medicaid recipient who earns
income is obligated to pay for his own medical care and contribute
a substantial portion of his income to the nursing home.10 2 On the
other hand, the court reasoned that an at-home spouse who earns
income uses it to pay for the care of another. 10 3 Therefore, the
court concluded that the at-home spouse's obligation to pay is not
as great. lO The court noted that the state has limited funds and,
therefore, is justified in preventing Medicaid recipients from shifting the entire cost of medical care to the government. 1 5
Similarly, in Turner v. Heckler, 106 decided the same year as Mattingly, a husband and wife challenged the validity of an MNA established under Ohio's reverse deeming practices. 0 7 In 1982, an
amendment to the Ohio Medicaid program was approved by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services.108 The amendment provided that an MNA of $222.00 per month would be set aside for
the at-home spouse when she depended upon the income of the
institutionalized recipient for support. 10 9 If the at-home spouse
earned any income from outside sources, however, the MNA
would be reduced, dollar for dollar, by the amount of the outside
income. 110 The plaintiffs in Turner argued that the amendment
97.

See supra note 90 and accompanying text.

98.

Mattingly, 784 F.2d at 267.

99. Id. at 266.
100. Id. at 266-67. The court reasoned that, if the at-home spouse retained a larger
portion of the couple's income, less would be available to the Medicaid recipient and the
government would have to pay the balance. Id.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 268.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

106.

783 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1986).

107.

Id. at 658 n.2.

108.

Id. at 658.

109.

OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:1-39-22 (1982). The non-institutionalized spouse in

this situation is often referred to as the "community spouse." Turner, 783 F.2d at 659.
110.

Turner, 783 F.2d at 659.
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failed to evaluate reasonably the level of the Medicaid recipient's
support obligation to his spouse.'"
The district court, however, never reached the issue of whether
the amendments violated the Medicaid statute." 2 Instead, the
court approved an interim settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and the Ohio Department of Public Welfare. The agreement
provided that the MNA would be increased from $222.00 to
$258.00, and defined spouses eligible for an MNA as those who
receive less than $324.00 per month in income from other
sources." 3 Therefore, only income received by the at-home spouse
in excess of $324.00 per month would reduce the MNA." 14
C. Ownership of Income
The Medicaid statute does not set forth criteria for determining
ownership of income." 5 Accordingly, the Health Care Financing
Administration ("HCFA") has developed the "name-on-the-instrument" rule to help determine ownership. Under this rule, a
couple's income belongs to the spouse whose name appears on the
instrument of payment. This rule applies to any type of benefits or
income that would be in one spouse's name." 16
The name-on-the-instrument rule is important because it is used
to calculate the amount of resources available to a Medicaid applicant for eligibility purposes. The rule does not affect spouses who
live together, because in those situations, their income and assets
are always counted together.'' When one of the spouses is institutionalized, however, the state must determine which resources are
available to help pay the cost of his care.
The name-on-the-instrument rule causes special problems in
community property states." 8 Under community property law,
each spouse has an undivided one-half interest in all real and per11. Id. The reasonableness standard is set out in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1982).
112. Turner, 783 F.2d 657. The district court granted an injunction of the amendment on finding that the Secretary failed to follow procedural prerequisites when approving the amendments. Id. at 660.
113. Id. at 661.
114.

The Secretary of HHS, however, has objected to this settlement and the State of

Ohio has sought reconsideration of the decision. To date, no decision on the petition for
reconsideration has been reached. Id. at 661 n. 15. The appellate court reversed the
injunction granted and remanded for reasons that are irrelevant to this discussion.
115. Purser v. Rahm, 104 Wash. 2d 159, 169, 702 P.2d 1196, 1201 (1985), cert. dismissed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3039 (U.S. July 22, 1986) (No. 85-663).
116. Id. at 164, 702 P.2d at 1199. The name-on-the-instrument rule is not set out in

any federal regulations or statutes. Id.
117.
118.

Id. at 165, 702 P.2d at 1200 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 435.723 (1985)).
The community property states are Arizona. California, Idaho. Louisiana. Ne-
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sonal property acquired by either or both of the spouses during the
marriage except property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance." 9 Because community property laws mandate that each
spouse "own" the income check, a conflict arises between state
community property laws and the HCFA's name-on-the-instrument rule.
Two cases in community property states have addressed this
conflict, with varied results.' 2 ° In Case of Hamner,'2 ' the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the HCFA's application of the federal Medicaid law preempted state community property laws.' 22
The Louisiana Department of Health and Human Resources denied the institutionalized applicant's request for Medicaid benefits
because his monthly income exceeded the maximum allowed by
the state.' 23 The applicant argued that, because Louisiana is a
community property state, his monthly retirement income was
community property and only one-half of it was applicable in determining eligibility.' 24 The court, affirming the denial of benefits,
stated that the applicant's monthly income "belonged [only] to
him." Accordingly, the court reasoned that the federal regulations
required that the applicant's income be taken into account when
determining eligibility. 25 The court also determined that, because
Louisiana was an SSI state, it was obligated to conform to SSI eligibility standards, "which require national uniformity."', 26 The
court, therefore, concluded that Louisiana could not apply differvada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 216 (1984).
119. Id. If, when determining the amount of income available to the applicant
spouse, the agency uses community property law, then the at-home spouse would always
be entitled to one-half of whatever income is received by the applicant, regardless of
whose name appears on the check. If the name-on-the-instrument rule is applied, however, the at-home spouse is allowed to retain only such income as is received in her name,
plus that portion of the applicant's income needed to make the at-home spouse's total
income equal to the SSI grant level. Purser, 104 Wash. 2d at 164, 169, 702 P.2d at 1199,
1201.
120. See Case of Hamner, 427 So. 2d 1188 (La. 1983); Purser, 104 Wash. 2d 159, 702
P.2d 1196. See also infra notes 121-32 and accompanying text.
121. Hamner, 427 So. 2d 1188 (La. 1983).
122. Id.
123. Id.at 1189.
124. Id.at 1189-90.
125. Id.at 1190 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.1101 (1980) ("an individual's income includes all of his own income in cash or in kind, both earned income and unearned
income.").
126. Hamner, 427 So. 2d at 1191. The court cited legislative history to demonstrate
Congress' intent for national uniformity in SSI eligibility standards: "the bill would substantially improve the effectiveness of the adult assistance programs under the Social Security Act by providing - for ... one combined adult assistance program which would
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ent standards than other SSI states merely because Louisiana is a
community property state.
An opposite conclusion was reached by the Washington
Supreme Court in Purser v. Rahm. 2 7 The plaintiffs in Purser argued that the state's community property laws invalidated the use
of the name-on-the-instrument rule.'28 The court held that federal
regulations did not preempt the state's community property laws
and thus concluded that the state's community property laws
should be used to determine ownership of income.129 In making
this determination, the court first looked at whether the asserted
right, the at-home spouse's right to her share of the income paid to
her spouse, conflicted with the express terms of the federal law.
The court then examined whether requiring preemption sufficiently
interfered with the objectives of the federal program. 3 ° Because
the Medicaid statute contains no express intent to preempt state
community property laws, the court concluded that the asserted
right did not conflict with the express terms of the federal law.' 3 '
In addition, the court found that the application of the community
property laws did not interfere with the objectives of the Medicaid
law. 132
Other courts also have applied state property law to determine
ownership of income in benefits cases. In Herrera v. Health and
Social Services, 133 the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the
state could consider only one-half of the plaintiff's income as available to him in determining eligibility. 134 Although the plaintiff's
only income came from his pension, the court reasoned that the
applicant's wife was entitled to one-half of his pension under appli35
cable community property laws.

In Nursing Home Residents' Advisory Council v. Kelly, 36 the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota addressed the issue of whether the state could consider available to a
be Federally administered by the Social Security Administration and would have nationally uniform requirements for such eligibility factors." Id.
127.

128.
129.
130.
(1979)).
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

104 Wash. 2d 159, 702 P.2d 1196 (1985).

Id. at 161, 702 P.2d at 1197-98.
Id. at 178, 702 P.2d at 1206.
Id. at 165, 702 P.2d at 1199 (citing Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 583
Purser, 104 Wash. 2d at 178, 702 P.2d at 1206.
Id.
587 P.2d 1342 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 588 P.2d 544 (N.M. 1978).
Id. at 1346.
Id. at 1345.
470 F. Supp. 747 (D. Minn. 1979).
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Medicaid applicant the equity value of a home in which the applicant's wife resided, when she refused to consent to its sale. The
court ruled that the home could not be considered available to the
applicant because, under Minnesota law, a spouse is unable to liquidate homestead property without the other spouse's consent.' 37
In Whaley v. Schweiker,1 38 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that pension benefits made payable to a
disabled veteran for the support of his children did not constitute
139
income to him in determining eligibility for SSI benefits.
Schweiker, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, contended that, because Whaley received one unapportioned check for
both him and his children, he was legally free to apply the funds to
his own needs rather than those of the children." 4 Therefore,
Schweiker contended, Whaley's entire pension was income to
him.14 ' The court rejected this argument and stated that it was
irrelevant that the benefits were sent in one check rather than
4 2
two. 1
The court reasoned that the legal status of payments is not
altered by the mechanism used to distribute them. 143
Some states have attempted to address the income and asset
ownership problem through legislation. For example, in California, spouses may execute a written interspousal agreement that divides community property into equal shares of separate
property.'44 The separate property of the applicant's spouse is considered unavailable to the applicant and need not be contributed to
the applicant's care. 145 In addition, in the absence of an agreement,
the state will consider the assets divided when making eligibility
determinations upon institutionalization. 46 Thus, the California
statute has the effect of applying only the actual assets of the applicant to the eligibility determination, leaving the spouse's assets
untouched.
Illinois has enacted a similar statute. Though Illinois is not a
community property state, it is a Section 209(b) state."' Because
of the practice of deeming, an at-home spouse in a Section 209(b)
137.

Id. at 749.

138.
139.
140.

663 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 872.
Id. at 873.

141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id. at 874.
Id.
(West 1986).

144.

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14006.2(b)

145.

Id.

146.
147.

Id. at § 14006.2(e).
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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state is in a situation similar to one in a community property state;
their resources remain "available" for their institutionalized
spouse. Under the Illinois statute, spouses may execute a written
agreement dividing their resources into separate but equal
shares. 41 8 The Illinois statute differs from the California legislation
by providing that the written agreement will be recognized only if
the nonrecipient spouse's share of the property is not made available to the person seeking medical assistance and that person does
not reside in the home.' 4 9 In addition, the Illinois statute specifically defers to federal law when federal law is in conflict with the
Illinois statute concerning consideration of resources. t5o
IV.

ANALYSIS

The at-home spouse of an institutionalized Medicaid recipient is
often forced to endure an intolerable financial strain as a result of
the practices and procedures established by the HCFA and individual state agencies."' In many of these instances, the financial
burdens are unnecessary; the result of the Medicaid Statute's
greater concern for managing funds than the welfare of the elderly.
A.

Deeming Problems in Section 209(b) States

1 52
The decision in Schweiker v. Gray Panthers
appears to have
ended the controversy regarding the validity of the deeming statute
as applied to Section 209(b) states. 5 3 The Supreme Court's ruling
that the deeming statute is valid has allowed states to continue
their deeming practice and, therefore, the burden associated with
deeming has continued. Because deeming of income in SSI states
can last for only one month after the spouses have ceased living
together, 5 4 an at-home spouse must suffer the burden only for this
limited time period. In contrast, the burden imposed on at-home
spouses living in Section 209(b) states may last indefinitely. These
states can deem for any time period their self-imposed standards
permit."'5 Accordingly, at-home spouses in Section 209(b) states
often must suffer the intolerable burden of living at or below the
poverty level the entire time their spouse is institutionalized. It is

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 5-4 (1986).
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 49-143 and accompanying text.
453 U.S. 34 (1981).
See supra notes 65-81 and accompanying text.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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unreasonable to burden an at-home spouse in a Section 209(b) state
indefinitely, while an at-home spouse in a neighboring SSI state
suffers for only one month.
B.

The Problem of Reverse Deeming

With deeming and reverse deeming, many times the funds the
at-home spouse has to live on (either the amount of their own income that remains after deeming or the amount provided by the
MNA) are inadequate. Reverse deeming, however, often has a
harsher effect. Because deeming in Section 209(b) states can potentially be of an unlimited duration, reverse deeming, which also can
have an unlimited time frame, is no worse than deeming in Section
209(b) states. The difference between deeming and reverse deeming manifests itself in SSI states where time limits restrict only
deeming practices. 1 5 6 In instituting the time limits for deeming,
Congress indicated that an at-home spouse should not be restricted
to a fixed income for more than one month. Because similar constraints were not placed on reverse deeming practices, an at-home
spouse could remain on a fixed income for the rest of her life, a
result that is arguably contrary to Congressional intent.
C. Problems with the Name-On-The-Instrument Rule
The question of whether the name-on-the-instrument rule
preempts state property law remains unsettled. The Purser"17 and
Hamner'58 courts offered different solutions. While the Hamner
court concluded that Federal Medicaid laws preempted state community property laws, the Purser court determined that instead,
community property laws are controlling. In two benefits cases,
however, Herrera v. Health and Social Services I and Nursing
Home Residents' Advisory Council v. Kelly, 160 the courts applied
state property laws to determine ownership of income.' 6 ' Those
benefit cases, however, addressed only the issue of whether state
law or the name-on-the-instrument rule should be used to determine income availability.' 62 To date, no case has considered the
156.

42 C.F.R. § 435.723(c) (1986).

157.
158.
159.

Purser, 104 Wash. 2d 159, 702 P.2d 1196.
Case of Hamner, 427 So. 2d 1188 (La. 1983).
587 P.2d 1342 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 588 P.2d 544 (N.M. 1978). See

supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
160. 470 F. Supp. 747 (D. Minn. 1979). See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying
text.
161. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
162. Id.
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issue of whether the name-on-the-instrument rule applies where no
conflicting state law exists.
The name-on-the-instrument rule fails to consider that a person
may have an interest in another person's property or income. A
spouse often has an interest in her marital partner's property or
income regardless of whether she "earned" it. At least one court
has recognized a non-working wife's interest in property based on
her contributions as a homemaker.' 63 Moreover, in some jurisdictions, marriage is viewed as a partnership; thus property acquired
during the marriage164belongs to both spouses regardless of who
holds nominal title.

The name-on-the-instrument rule also breeds inconsistency. In
an SSI state, if the at-home spouse receives income in her name,
she is allowed to retain all of it for her own use. 165 If the institutionalized spouse receives the income in his name, however, he
must contribute all but his spouse's maintenance allowance to the
cost of his care. 166 Therefore, while the name-on-the-instrument
rule benefits couples whose income is in the name of the at-home
spouse, it burdens couples whose income nominally belongs to the
institutionalized spouse.
Although the HCFA has not indicated that it will cease using
the name-on-the-instrument rule, at least one court has implied
that the rule is improper. 167 In Whaley v. Schweiker, 6 1 the court
held that pension benefits received by the applicant should not be
included in his income merely because the check is made payable
to him. 69 The funds were intended to support his children and the
court appropriately concluded that the payment mechanism used
is irrelevant.' 70
163. Pepin v. Pepin, 429 A.2d 1005 (Me. 1981) (divorce proceedings where court
held it was proper to award the wife a portion of the marital property based upon her

service as a homemaker).
164.

Grant v. Grant, 424 A.2d 139, 144 (Me. 1981) (Glassman. J.,concurring).

165. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
166. Id.
167. Whaley v. Schweiker, 663 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1981). See supra notes 138-43 and
accompanying text.
168. 663 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1981). See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 873-74. The court in Tsosie v. Califano, 651 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1981),
held that pension benefits received by a surviving spouse and intended to support the
spouse's children were not income to the spouse despite the fact that the children's benefits were made payable to the surviving spouse. It stated that "the payee of the check
should not be determinative. If the money is to be used for the children, it is not the
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RECOMMENDATIONS

The best solution to all three burdens would be for states to enact legislation similar to that adopted by Illinois, a Section 209(b)
state, and California, a community property state. Those statutes
allow spouses to divide their property pursuant to an agreement, 17
a practice that has resolved some of the confusion in community
property states concerning the ownership of family assets. It also
would help eliminate the problems associated with deeming in Section 209(b) states and reverse deeming in all states.
If the individual states do not enact such legislation, the federal
government should amend the Social Security Act to force Section
209(b) states to modify their deeming practices. Deeming should
be eliminated or, at the very least, time restrictions should be imposed prohibiting Section 209(b) states from deeming for longer
periods than allowed in SSI states. Congressional intent in instituting the SSI program was to improve the effectiveness of assistance
and promote nationally uniform eligibility requirements. 72 The
existence of unlimited deeming in Section 209(b) states, however,
inherently conflicts with the ideal of uniformity: while the at-home
spouse in a Section 209(b) state must deem a portion of her income
to pay for the institutionalized spouse, another individual similarly
situated in a neighboring SSI state is allowed to retain all of her
income.
Congress provided for the Section 209(b) option because it
feared that some states would not participate in the Medicaid program if their cost of instituting a program increased. 73 But it has
been more than a decade since this option was offered and states
have had time to adjust to the change brought about by SSI. The
federal government should now require Section 209(b) states to
change their deeming practices within a specified period of time.
spouse's income . . .Nor is it actually available in any meaningful sense." Tsosie, 651
F.2d at 723.
In Cannuni v. Schweiker, 740 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1984), the court again impliedly invalidated the name-on-the-instrument rule. In Cannuni, an SSI applicant was found eligible
for benefits even though his name appeared on some bank accounts with his parents and
the amounts therein would give him resources above the limits imposed for eligibility. Id.
at 265. The court concluded that under state property law, the mere creation of a multiple party savings account did not transfer ownership of any funds to the applicant and the
funds remained property of his parents and were thus unavailable for his own use. Id. at
264-65.

171. See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
172. Case of Hamner, 427 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (La. 1983) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 231,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4989, 4992).
173. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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This regulation would allow the states time to allocate a larger portion of their budgets for the anticipated increase in payments to
recipients. To ensure compliance, the federal government should
threaten to cut off other federal aid to states that refuse to comply.
Because of the serious nature of the problem, the federal government should take immediate and strong steps to eradicate the inequity inherent in the Section 209(b) option.
An acceptable solution to the problem of reverse deeming is an
increase in the amount of the maintenance allowance given to athome spouse. Many maintenance allowances remain at 1972
levels,1 74 failing to account for inflation and cost of living increases. 175 Although increases in maintenance allowances probably would be met with much resistance, other than the abolition of
reverse deeming, nothing else could prevent elderly from living at
antiquated income levels.
The only plausible solution to the name-on-the-instrument rule
is its abolition. The rule is unreasonable, has inconsistent results,
and fails to respect the other spouse's interest in that income. Pensions 176 and other retirement income is "acquired" during the marriage and should be shared by the spouses without regard for
whose name is on the check. Because the spouse whose name does
not appear on the instrument almost certainly contributed to the
marital relationship, there is no justifiable explanation why that
spouse should be deprived of her share of the family income.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The current Medicaid program presents the elderly with intolerable burdens. Elderly individuals should not be forced to choose
between contributing their money to their institutionalized
spouses' care, thereby forcing themselves to live at or below the
poverty level, or refusing to contribute and facing the possibility
that their spouses will be denied necessary medical care. Additionally, individuals needing care might not enter nursing homes in
order to protect their spouse's remaining resources. The only
other alternative may be legal separation or divorce.
174. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 55 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175. Id. Seealsoid. atn.l.
176. Pensions are received by husband and wife as a family unit. Mattingly, 784 F.2d
at 271 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). When the working spouse joins a pension plan, he intends that, in the future, the funds received from the plan will provide support for both
husband and wife. A pension fund basically is a form of deferred compensation earned
by one spouse and contemplated to be used by both spouses in the future. Damiano v.
Damiano, 94 A.D.2d 132, 137, 463 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480 (2d Dept. 1983).
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The effects that deeming, reverse deeming, and the name-on-theinstrument rule have on elderly Medicaid recipients and their
spouses must be closely examined. Solutions must be found that
alleviate the burdens associated with these practices. Although
states have a legitimate interest in keeping expenditures down and
avoiding paying for those people who have the means to pay for
themselves, the states' interests should not be pursued at the expense of the health and welfare of our nation's elderly.
PAUL DRIZNER

